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45
(5) Now the verb that joins the predicate with the subject is called
the  copula .
[Chapter 32]
[Ch. 32 in on how the predicate can be said to  inhere in or
5  be in the subject. Ockham analyzes propositions about the
predicate s  being in or  inhering in the subject in terms of
the predicate s being predicated of the subject.]
[Chapter 33]
(1)  To signify is taken in many senses among logicians. In one
10 sense a sign is said to  signify something when it supposits, or is apt to
supposit, for it çø in such a way, that is, that the name is predicated by
means of the verb  is of a pronoun pointing to it. Thus,  white signifies
Socrates. For  He is white is true, pointing to Socrates. Thus [too],
 rational signifies a man. For  He is rational is true, pointing to a man.
15 And so on for many other concrete [terms].
(2)  To signify is taken in another sense when the sign can supposit
for the [thing] in some proposition about the past or about the future or
about the present, or in some true proposition about a mode. In this sense,
 white not only signifies what is now white, but [also] what can be white.
20 For in the proposition  A white177 can run , taking the subject for what can
be, the subject supposits for the [things] that can be white.
(3) Taking  to signify in the first sense, and [the term]  significate
corresponding to it, an utterance (and even a concept) often falls away from
its significate through only a change in the thing. That is, something ceases
25 to be signified that was signified earlier. [But] taking  to signify in the sec-
ond sense, and [the term]  significate corresponding to it, an utterance or
concept does not fall away from its significate through only a change in the
external thing.
(4)  To signify is taken in [yet] another sense, when that from
30 which the utterance is imposed is said to be signified, or what is signified in
the first sense by a principal concept or a principal utterance.178 In this
sense, we say that  white signifies a whiteness because  whiteness signi-
177
That is, a white thing. Latin often uses the neuter forms of adjectives as though
they were nouns.
178
 Principal here seems to mean something like  absolute . See the examples.
Copyright © 1995 by Paul Vincent Spade. This document may be copied and circulated
freely, provided only that this notice of copyright is included with all copies.
46
fies a whiteness. Nevertheless, the sign  white does not supposit for this
whiteness. So [too],  rational , if it is a difference, signifies the intellective
soul.
(5) In another sense,  to signify is taken most broadly when some
5 sign that is apt to be a part of a proposition, or is apt to be a proposition or
expression, conveys something, whether principally or secondarily, whether
in the nominative or in an oblique case, whether it gives [one] to understand
it, or connotes it, or signifies it in any way whatever, or signifies it affirma-
tively or negatively. For example, the name  blind signifies sight, because
10 [it does so] negatively, and the name  immaterial signifies matter nega-
tively, and the name  nothing or  non-something signifies something, but
negatively. Anselm talks about this way of signifying in On the Fall of the
Devil.179
(6)  To signify , therefore, in one or another signification of [the
15 word], belongs to any universal [term whatever]. For  a universal , accord-
ing to Damascene in his Logic, Ch. 48,180  is what signifies many [things]
çø for instance,  man ,  animal . For every universal [term] either signifies
several [things] in the first sense or the second, because every universal is
predicated of several [things], either in an assertoric proposition about the
20 present, or in a proposition about the past or future or a mode.
(7) From this it is clear that those [people] are in error who say that
the utterance  man does not signify all men. For, since the universal  man ,
according to the above Doctor,181 signifies several [things], and it does not
signify several things that are not men, [therefore] it has to signify several
25 men. This is to be granted, because nothing is signified by  man except a
man, and no one man any more than another.
(8) Every universal, therefore, signifies several [things]. But a uni-
versal that is a genus or species, which is predicated of a pronoun pointing
to some thing, does not signify several [things] except by taking  to signify
30 in the first sense or the second sense. But the remaining universals signify
several [things] in the first sense or the second, and some [things] too in the
third sense or the fourth. For every other universal signifies something in
the nominative and something in an oblique case. This is clear with
 rational and  risible , and so on.
179
Anselm, De casu diaboli, Ch. 11. See Jasper Hopkins & Herbert Richardson,
trs., Anselm of Canterbury: Truth, Freedom, and Evil. Three Philosophical Dialogues,
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 163 168.
180
John Damascene, Dialectica, Ch. 65, PL 94, col. 659A; Latin translation of
Robert Grosseteste, Ch. 48, ed. cit., p. 50.
181
That is, Damascene, ibid.
Copyright © 1995 by Paul Vincent Spade. This document may be copied and circulated
freely, provided only that this notice of copyright is included with all copies.
47
[Chapter 63]
(1) Now that we have talked about the signification of terms, it re-
mains to talk about supposition, which is a property that belongs to a term,
5 but only when [it occurs] in a proposition.
(2) Now first, you must know that supposition is taken in two
senses, namely, broadly and strictly. Taken broadly, it is not distinguished
from appellation. Rather, appellation is contained under supposition. In an-
other sense it is taken strictly, insofar as it is distinguished from appellation.
10 But I do not intend to speak about supposition in that sense, but rather only
in the first sense. Thus, both the subject and the predicate supposit. And in
general, whatever can be the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits.
(3) Supposition is so called as, so to speak, a  positing for an-
other ,182 in such a way that when a term in a proposition stands for some-
15 thing, so that we use the term for something of which (or of a pronoun
pointing to it) that term (or the nominative of that term, if it is in an oblique
case) is verified, it supposits for that [thing]. At least this is true when the
suppositing term is taken significatively.
(4) So in general, a term supposits for that of which (or of a pronoun
20 pointing to it) the predicate is denoted by the proposition to be predicated, if
the suppositing term is the subject. But if the suppositing term is the predi-
cate, it is denoted that the subject is in subject position with respect to it (or
with respect to a pronoun pointing to it) if the proposition is formed.183 For
example, it is denoted by  A man is an animal that Socrates truly is an
25 animal, so that  This is an animal , pointing to Socrates, is true if it is
formed. But it is denoted by  Man is a name that the utterance  man is a
name, [and] therefore in this [proposition]  man supposits for the utterance
[itself]. Likewise, it is denoted by  A white184 is an animal that the thing
that is white is an animal, so that  This is an animal , pointing to the thing
30 that is white, is true. For this reason, the subject  supposits for that thing.
(5) So, analogously, it must be said in the case of the predicate. For
it is denoted by  Socrates is white that Socrates is this thing that has a [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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